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The Centre for Applied and Social Sciences (C A S S ) at the University of Zimbabwe and the 
Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS) at the University of the Western Cape 
are jointly implementing a three-year regional programme of analysis and communication on 
CBNRM  in Southern Africa. The Ford Foundation and the International Development 
Research Centre (ID R C) fund the programme.
The aim of the programme is to contribute to the sustainable enhancement of rural 
livelihoods in Southern Africa by promoting a broader and deeper understanding of how 
natural resources can be used and managed sustainably through group based institutions 
and decision-making. The specific objectives for the programme are to:
♦ Enhance regional understanding of opportunities and constraints of CB N R M  through in- 
depth analysis, comparison, synthesis, theoretical development and operational 
recommendations;
♦ Draw lessons for CBNRM  policy and practice through the analysis of cross-regional and 
cross-sectoral commonalties and differences;
♦ Contribute to improvement in the practice of CBNRM ;
♦ Make a range of actors and agencies in Southern Africa more aware of CBNRM  
concepts, activities, methods, opportunities and constraints by stimulating debate and by 
communicating ideas and information;
♦ Contribute to the regional validation of group based systems of resource tenure and 
management as viable modern frameworks for sustainable development and as 
economically, environmentally and socially legitimate alternatives to individualised, 
freehold based systems.
The programme has two components:
■ comparative analysis of CBNR M  issues in Southern Africa that are undertaken by 
programme staff and by recipients of programme research grants; and,
■ communications activities by the programme to disseminate information and analysis 
and stimulate debate on CBNR M  through an open and a moderated Internet forum; and 
through the publication of short guideline papers on policy and practice, research papers, 
and newsletters.
Each year, key CBNR M  themes are identified by participants within the programme to 
stimulate debate: at regional meetings, through e-mail discussions, and CBNRM  
newsletters. This Occasional Paper Series is designed to publicise research papers that 
have relevant aspects of CBNR M  across southern Africa and that may help enhance the 
standard of living of those who practise it.
Traditional and Modern Institutions of Governance in Community 
Based Natural Resource Management
P. W.Mamimine1 and S.Mandivengerei2
Abstract
The advent of independence in most Southern African countries ushered in a new 
political dispensation emphasising democratic governance as the hallmark of a 
modern polity. Institutions evolving from this thrust are perceived as modern in 
contrast to those that are or were based on ascribed status-traditional institutions. In 
community-based natural resource management (CBNRM ), post-independence 
governments have either condoned or legislated for the complete replacement of 
traditional institutions by modern institutions of governance. This 'discard approach’, 
based on governments’ perception of traditional institutions of governance as 
undemocratic and archaic, has deprived CBNRM  of change with continuity. This 
resulted in either total or semi-marginalisation of traditional institutions in CBNRM 
thereby fomenting conflict, confusion and semi-anarchy. In this paper we review 
literature from South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Zambia to obtain insights on 
how the relationship between traditional and modem institutions of governance in the 
post-independence era affect CBNRM. On the basis of the insights, we argue that 
successful and sustainable CBNRM neither hinge on the discard approach nor 
exclusive reliance on modern institutions of governance. The  forging of partnerships 
in CBNRM between the two institutions of governance seems to hold a more 
promising approach to sustainable CBNRM.
Introduction
To varying degrees, traditional institutions have been disenfranchised, both before and after 
independence (Boesen & Rukuni, 2000:35). Consequent to the attainment of independence 
in the four Sub Saharan African countries, of Zimbabwe, South Africa, Zambia and Namibia, 
governments in their attempt to institute democracy at the local level, began a systematic 
sidelining of traditional leadership. They have literally done away with most local traditional 
structures of governance that had hitherto been the pillars of colonial communal land 
administration. Th e  ‘modernising’ thrust adopted by the new governments emanated from 
their perception of traditional leadership as stumbling blocks to the evolution, nurturing and 
exercise of local democracy hence the need for the creation of new structures to replace 
traditional authorities. However, the entry of a new actor in communal lands administration 
did not bring respite to the problem of natural resource management, instead, incessant 
territorial fights for control of communal lands between the new actor (modem institutions) 
and the old (traditional authorities) have generally compromised the efficiency of community 
based natural resource management (CBN R M ).
Sub-Saharan African governments’ institutional structures for development lack sound 
representation by traditional leadership. In other words, traditional institutions of governance 
have not been merged with governments’ modern governance structures. This paper 
reviews literature from the four countries to derive policy insights on the relationship between 
modern and traditional institutions of governance in natural resource management. Much of 
the literature on common property resource management in Africa suggests that natural 
resource use before the imposition of colonial rule was regulated by forms of traditional
1 Lecturer, Centre for Applied Social Sciences, University of Zimbabwe, Harare.
2 Research Assistant, Centre for Applied Social Sciences, University of Zimbabwe, Harare
1
management (Thom as }991, Mandondo 1997, Ntsala, 1995). This viewpoint insinuates that 
traditional institutions of governance have the capacity to oversee an efficient CBN R M . 
However, this paper 'neither advocates for a 'back-to-the-past’ nor the granting of an 
exclusive mandate to modem institutions of governance in community-based natural 
resource management. Th e  way forward in sustainable C B N R M  seems to lie in the middle, 
which entails the institutions working as 'nested’ enterprises (see Ostrom, 1990). In 
essence, each institution cannot do without the other in achieving sustainable CBNRM .
Traditional Authority in Colonial and Post-Colonial Africa
The co-op(ion of traditional authorities into colonial administration came about as a result of 
colonialists’ quest to stabilise 'alien rule’ Mamdani 1996:16). Traditional authorities such as 
chiefs were part and parcel of the colonialists’ arm of 'indirect rule’ which was preserved for 
rural areas and was all about incorporating natives into state enforced customary order 
(Mamdani, 1996:18). Th e  strategy of divide and rule saw colonialists forming native 
institutions through which to rule subjects on tribal lines, using customary law, which was 
defined in the plural as 'the law of different tribes’. Th e  chieftainship that the colonialists 
created was built on the administrative variant not the traditional, and laid the basis of 
decentralised despotism (Mamdani: Ibid). Th e  chief was pivotal in the colonial 
administration. Ntsebeza (1999) observes that key to the authority of the chief was the fusion 
of various powers in his office, rather than a separation thereof. Mamdani uses the analogy 
of a “clenched fist” to depict the concentration of power.
Most African governments after political independence have maintained the colonial legacy 
of inadvertently undermining indigenous customary systems. Boesen and Rukuni (2000:34) 
contend that abuse and exploitation by colonial and contemporary governments alike has 
shown little respect or understanding of the traditional systems. Similarly, governments have 
shown little appreciation that traditional institutions are unique and develop over time to suit 
local needs. Within Africa, there appears to be ingrained colonial and post-colonial belief that 
indigenous or traditional systems are incompatible with Western or modem systems of 
governance, as well as associated economic institutions.
Unpacking Concepts: 'governance’, 'institutions’, 'community’, 'traditional 
authority/institutions’ and 'm odem  institutions of governance’
Hyden (1992:7) defines governance as the conscious management of regime structures with 
a view to enhancing the legitimacy of the public realm. Th e  four properties essential to 
achieving this are, 'authority’, reciprocity’, 'trust1 and 'accountability’ (Fieid-Juma, 1996:13). 
The legal framework policies and institutions both formal and informal are then the 
mechanisms through which governance finds expression, from the local to the global level. 
According to Field-Juma (1996:14), institutions are the most broad-based element of 
governance, existing at the formal level, including the norms and behaviour at the local level.
Redfield cited in Cousins (1993) observes that there are four defining features of a 
community, that is, distinctiveness, small size, self-sufficiency and homogeneity of 
inhabitants. However, Cohen cited in Cousins (1993) argues that 'community’implies both 
similarity and difference. Th e  term expresses a relational, the opposition of one group to 
other social entities. Cousins (1993), contends that this sense of discrimination is embodied 
in the boundary which may be political, linguistic, religious or exist mainly in the minds of 
beholders. In other words, a sense of community is based on feelings of oneness that a 
group has against others or perceived outsiders.
Murphree (1994) perceives traditional authority as structures of authority and power whose 
legitimacy is based on a shared value system and collective cohesiveness. This type of 
authority is rooted in a shared history and legitimacy derived from kinship and descent. In 
essence, its legitimacy is embedded in the social and cultural life of rural communities, 
where the discourses of ‘tradition’ and cultural identity’ remain persuasive for many of the
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residents (Cousins, 1997). Murphree and Cousins’ observations on the nature of traditional 
leadership aptly describe perceptions of traditional institutions of governance during colonial 
(apartheid included) and pre-colonial political systems in Southern Africa. However, the 
institution of traditional leadership faces a crisis of legitimacy in post-independence political 
dispensations. Empirical evidence from South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Zambia 
relegates claims of 'shared values’, 'collective cohesiveness’ and 'cultural rationality’ 
identified with traditional institutions to mere normative judgments. In fact, from the viewpoint 
of modern democracy, Murphree and Cousins present a romanticised picture of traditional 
institutions of governance but this critique hardly suggests that with regard to democratic 
governance, traditional and modern institutions are absolutely antithetical.
Thomson cited in W unsch (1990) also regards traditional institutions of authority as diverse 
mechanisms by which Africans regulated social and economic affairs, exercised and 
controlled political power in the pre-colonial era. Village councils promulgated and enforced 
access rules that regulated the balance between livestock, water and forage, assuring that 
overgrazing was minimized. According to Thomson, the institution served as an embodiment 
and guardian of people’s norms and values. Nevertheless, if this holds true, does the current 
unpopularity of the role of traditional leaders in natural resource management imply the non­
existence of shared values between the people they govern and them? This raises one 
fundamental question, to what extent are the so-called 'shared values’ really shared?
On the other hand, modern institutions of governance are structures steeped in Western 
traditions, invariably bureaucratic and inherited in part or wholly by post-colonial sub- 
Saharan African governments from their former colonial masters. Field-Juma (1996) 
observes that modern institutions of governance are based on the nation state, with norms 
and values that were entrenched in developing countries during the colonial era and 
reaffirmed at independence. In essence, they had their roots in the centrist, elitist and 
absolutist government system, which concentrated the authority to establish, revise and 
interpret rules in a structure entirely removed from local popular mechanisms of control 
[Wunsch, 1990: 26]. Furthermore, Field-Juma (1996) argues that modern institutions tend to 
have one major shortcoming, that of being characterized by centralized structures which 
separate the resource users from the decision makers, thereby circumscribing the flow of 
information. Wunsch and Jum a’s observations typify the operational procedures and 
structure of modern institutions of governance at district, provincial and national levels, in 
most post-colonial administrations in Africa. Th e  situation at the grassroots or local level is 
different. Civic organisations and Village Development Committees (V ID CO s), responsible 
for natural resource management at local level in South Africa and Zimbabwe, respectively, 
indicate some semblance of accountability to the people and the adoption of a participatory 
approach to management. A  similar situation obtains in Namibia and Zambia.
The Dis-empowerment of Traditional Institutions of Governance
In 1984, Zimbabwe created new local government structures in order to restructure local 
resource management within the framework of a socialist ideology. This resulted in the 
emergence of 'popularly elected’ village development committees (V ID C O s) and Ward 
development committees (W A D C O s) with a mandate to monitor resource use within their 
boundaries. Th e  transition from traditional authority to modern, elected bureaucratic authority 
has been characterised by conflict (Mukamuri 1995, Campbell et al 1997). W A D C O s  and 
VIDCOs purport to be representative of the communities who elect them into office, yet they 
lack legitimacy in the eyes of the same communities. This hampers the smooth execution of 
their duties. Furthermore, V ID C O s and W A D C O s  are in essence more of political rather than 
administrative structures, making the incumbents wary of enforcing decisions that may be 
deemed unpopular by their constituent communities thereby jeopardizing their chances of re- 
election. This political and social milieu at grassroots level curtails the evolution of modern 
structures of governance into effective and legitimate resource policing bodies. In the case of 
Zimbabwe and South Africa, this has been worsened by the fact that modern institutions
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have tried to sway local communities to their side. For instance, in South Africa, traditional 
authorities are dismissed by modern local structures as a regrettable hangover of the 
oppressive apartheid homeland system, hence they are deemed irrelevant in the current 
thrust of democratisation of local governance (see Fakir & Mayet 1998).
In Zimbabwe, the Communal Land Act of 1982 vests all land authority with the District 
Councils, which in turn delegate authority to allocate land to the V ID C O s and W A D C O s  
creating a convoluted institutional framework. Murombedzi (1992) asserts that the extent to 
which these lower tier institutions have been able to dispense this function remains an open 
question. They have been caught in the throes of conflict with other existing institutions at 
that level, wanting to assert their own authority over land, especially the chiefs, headmen 
and kraalheads. In essence, V ID C O s and W A D C O s  are not legally constituted; hence, they 
are not empowered to be land and resource management units. Furthermore, they are not 
resource utilization units nor do they correspond in any way to resource use patterns in their 
areas, which often cut across ward and village boundaries (Murombedzi, 1992).
In fact, much of the legislation passed since independence in Zimbabwe dis-empowered 
traditional leadership. This was in spite of the fact that “chiefs, sub-chiefs, headmen and 
kraalheads in effect constituted the communal lands’ administrative and legal institutions 
with historically defined areas and sets of rules and regulations clearly understood by the 
rural people (Thom as, 1991). Th e  emasculation of traditional institutions had its roots in the 
superimposition of colonial institutions on local institutions to service the needs of a new 
economic order and political dispensation.
In South Africa, the rise of liberation movements in the rural areas and townships saw the 
beginning of new and competing ideologies that also deliberately sought to undermine the 
role of traditional leaders by questioning and de-legitimising traditional rule systems (Fakir & 
Mayet, 1998). Th e  introduction of new ideologies and forms of political discourse and rules 
espoused by liberation politics had a crippling effect on the exercise of customary rules and 
norms. Customary law and traditional authorities are dismissed as undemocratic since they 
were formally used to prop up, entrench and perpetuate the apartheid regime’s control over 
areas occupied by black South Africans. Hence, this provides a rationale for them to be 
shunned by all and sundry in the pursuance of democracy and good governance.
On Namibia’s communal landscape, there exists no encouraging dimension to the 
community based natural resource management question. Traditional authorities for the 
management of common property resources have also undergone the same trials and 
tribulations witnessed elsewhere in Southern Africa as the modernising drive took its course.
While under South African colonial rule the common perception in Namibia’s communal 
lands was that land belonged to the chiefs who in practice were the de facto land allocating 
authorities, post independence government policy has impinged on this authority (Jones 
1999). Jones (1999) views the erosion of the authority of traditional leadership and its 
usurpation by modem institutions of governance as having contributed to a large extent to 
the development of ‘open access’ regimes on much of Namibia’s communal lands. In 
essence, in the ensuing environment where no credible, effective and legitimate authority 
exists, communal area residents lack the ability to deter others from personal appropriation 
of the land and its resources. Jones (1999) further observes that in such circumstances 
people appeared to have little incentive to invest time and effort in managing the land and its 
resources for the future and they had developed an inclination towards using what they 
could before someone else did. As Katjiua (1998) observes, the fragmentation of rural 
institutions accompanied by deprivation of natural resource ownership has left some 
communities in Namibia with no other option but to overexploit the resources.
This observation is corroborated by Blackie’s (1998) reports of escalating cases of 
spontaneous enclosure of large areas of grazing land by anyone who could afford fencing 
material culminating in the disruption of seasonal migratory routes of livestock. Bromley and 
Cernea (1989) argue that it is the norm everywhere that when local level institutional
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arrangements are undermined or destroyed, the erstwhile common property regimes were 
gradually converted into “open access” regimes in which the 'rule of capture’, drive each to 
get as much as possible before others. It is important to realise that although their areas fall 
under the communal land and is therefore state-owned, traditional authorities still maintained 
territorial claims which specified rules of access to resources. In some communal areas 
where they remained strong and respected, traditional authorities continued to enforce these 
rules. Katjiua (1998) contends that it was these rules that created incentives for a member of 
a tribe to remain with the tribe and have a sense of belonging and acceptance, and to share 
in the well being of the community.
The waning of authority and responsibility over natural resources management by traditional 
authorities engendered by their loss of control of the communal lands to modern institutions 
of governance is also a feature of Zambia’s communal lands administration. Kamuhuza 
(1995) observes that rural communities no longer viewed themselves as the real owners of 
the resources in their areas ascribing such ownership to the government. In effect, with the 
government’s passing of a new Land Act in 1995, which usurped traditional leaders’ 
authority over land allocation and other associated responsibilities over natural resources, 
rural communities were of the perception that nobody in particular had the responsibility over 
natural resources (IU C N -R O S A  1998). This change in legislation whereby^traditional 
authorities have been deprived of the responsibility over natural resources has weakened 
the system because there is little flow of information, no effective control over utilisation and 
lack of respect for traditional knowledge and values. In essence, natural resources are 
exploited as “open access” as they are perceived as belonging to everybody and at the 
same time to nobody as is the case with national or state property (Kamuhuza, 1995:33).
Zambia’s land tenure systems and supporting legal framework inherited at independence 
remain the major impediment influencing and determining the development of land 
resources (Chileshe 1998). In most rural areas random and unplanned allocation of land by 
traditional authorities has continued resulting in disorderly settlements and unregulated 
exploitation of natural resources (Ibid). Thus, despite government’s creation of modern 
institutions of governance to take over roles hitherto the preserve of chiefs and headmen, 
traditional authorities were clinging on to their accustomed duties which they now 
implemented haphazardly.
Various studies on natural resource management in Zambia point to the proliferation of 
conflict in resource use due to the tenuous link between resource use and resource tenure 
(Chinene, 1992, Chileshe 1998, Mwenya, 1992). Th e  marginalisation of traditional 
leadership initially by the colonial regime and presently by the post independence 
government destroyed the tradition and custom embedded in the tribal system (Mwenya 
1992).
Governance, Competition and the Weakening of CBNRM
The coming of independence in South Africa, and accompanying new forms of legitimate 
authority allowing new social actors into the political arena compounded the local institutional 
framework. Kepe (1997) observes that present day South Africa’s rural communities are not 
homogenous, harmonious and collective groupings with firm and effective traditional 
leadership rooted in the past. Instead, there has been a growing reconfiguration of local 
political power and increased contestation of leadership and authority thereby precluding any 
idealized notions of community. These new power relations at the local level have 
consequently affected the institutional matrix and impacted on people’s access to resources 
and use including the way different practices are interpreted and legitimised (Kepe, 1997: 
53).
Murombedzi (1990) observes that far from providing solutions for resource degradation, 
modern institutions of governance in Zimbabwe inherently lack the ability to regulate access 
to and utilization of common property resources. Th e  same scenario obtains in South Africa
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where Fakir (1995) observes that in most communal lands local government is weak and it 
has poor delivery systems.
Perhaps a clearer picture of the protracted struggles for power and control of the communal 
areas between traditional authorities and modern institutions of governance may be aptly 
illustrated by the case of Mkambati Nature Reserve (South Africa). For generations, people 
in neighbouring Pondoland communal lands scrounged for wild fruits, game and other 
resources from Mkambati. Th e  presence of modern institutions of governance affected the 
hunting activities of local communities in various ways (Kepe, 1997). In order to claim 
authority over chiefs and headmen of the area and be seen as legitimate leaders, pursuing 
local development, local civic organisations encouraged clandestine poaching of wild game. 
This was a way of asserting their rights over an environment they hold to belong to the 
community. At the same time they attempted pursuing negotiations with the Reserve 
authorities to demonstrate to the communities their capacity to interact with and influence 
government bureaucracy on their behalf (Kepe, 1997:/b/c0.
However, it is worth noting that some people who remained loyal to the headmen or chiefs 
loathed these practices. In this environment, conservation authorities eager to negotiate co­
management arrangements for the Reserve’s resources suffered a setback since it was not 
clear who to initiate discussions with. This is succinctly put in one official’s words, Th e re  is 
no community and no leadership; it’s just one big minefield!’ (Kepe, 1997:53).
A similarly chaotic institutional arrangement prevailed in the communal lands offhe Peddie 
District where Fakir (1995) observed that people knew what needed to be done about the 
management of their resources but could not agree under what auspices and authority it 
could be done. An effective management system could not be put in place nor could 
institutions execute their functions properly amid a multiplicity of political and other social 
structures at play. A  result of this breakdown of administrative control was the virtual 
collapse of agricultural extension in the Peddie District. Livestock grazing was no longer 
controlled at any level and fencing of common areas and along roads had been lost through 
lack of maintenance and theft by people in villages, who took both the fencing and poles to 
enclose their homesteads and home gardens. Th e  tribal authority system had been rejected 
by all village communities in favour of A N C  aligned S A N C O  resident associations. Factions 
of people, usually small in number who are loyal to the headman still existed in practically 
every village and this further weakened village and district administration (Ainslie and Fox 
1995:34).
In Zimbabwe legislation governing the exploitation of natural resources overrides the 
authority of traditional leadership in the communal lands. Th e  Communal Land Act, 1982, for 
example, places the control of communal lands under the President through the Rural 
District Councils rather than under chiefs, headmen and kraalheads. As Nhira et al (1998) 
observe this Act not only empowers Rural District Councils to develop land use plans that 
override customary land claims, but also provides for their control of woodlands utilization. 
The Rural District Councils Act mandates Rural District Councils to enact by- laws to 
regulate natural resource use and issue licenses for the commercial extraction of wood 
products. In effect these Acts provide for the regulation of natural resource use in the 
communal lands without any regard for the authority and concerns of the local traditional 
leadership.
New legislation has not only usurped traditional leadership’s authority over communal land 
resources but it has also altered their jurisdictional and administrative boundaries. Writing on 
the effects of legislation governing the mining of minerals on local environments in the 
communal lands, Mamimine (1999) observes that the Mines and Minerals Act entrusted the 
control of all mining activities under the Minister of Mines, Environment and Tourism. The 
implications of the Act to the local institutions of governance were that mining 
concessionaires were not answerable to the traditional authorities under whose jurisdiction 
their mining claims fell.
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In a study on stone mining in Guruve district, Mamimine (1999) observes that the overriding 
authority over local institutions conferred on the mining concessionaires by the mining 
licenses they held rendered traditional leadership ineffectual in managing stones (mined for 
mementoes carving) and other resources in their areas. This resulted in over mining of the 
stones and degradation of the environment. Mining claims were launched and processed in 
Harare (the capital) with traditional leadership having no role to play in the transaction. One 
headman commented, “These strangers (miners) come from Harare holding a paper 
(license) which allows them to do anything they want with stones in this area and I have no 
say over what they do”(Mamimine, 1999:150).
While Rural District Councils have the authority to manage and regulate the utilisation of 
natural resources in their areas of jurisdiction through the application of land use and 
conservation by-laws, enforcement of the by-laws by local institutions of governance is at 
best negligible. Th e  political dynamics which traditional authorities and modern institutions of 
governance namely V ID C O S  and W A D C O S  have been enmeshed in precludes effective 
enforcement of resource-use-by-laws. While traditional leaders have been systematically 
undermined and viewed as retrogressive and undemocratic, V ID C O S  and W A D C O S  in a bid 
to position themselves as bastions of local democracy have contested the administrative 
powers of traditional leaders thereby wresting control of communal lands from them. 
Mamimine (1999) observes a third dimension to the power struggle whereby the local 
leadership of the ruling party commanded more respect and authority than the local 
headmen. Th e  struggle for power and control of communal lands between traditional and 
modern institutions of governance has often resulted in a vacuum permitting a few daring 
individuals to be primary beneficiaries.
Nemarundwe (2000) contends that the prevailing environment in Zimbabwe is so chaotic 
that in many communal lands many people violate land use by-laws by converting land 
originally demarcated as pasture into arable land with the blessing of modem institutions of 
governance. Nemarundwe chronicles incidences of desperate land seekers in Chivi District 
liaising with one of the local institutions in order to get land in the absence of consensus 
between traditional authorities, V ID C O s and W A D C O s. Thus, the existence of the two 
systems of control, that is the traditional authorities (chiefs and headmen) and modern 
institutions (V ID C O S  and W A D C O S ), without well defined mandates and articulation . 
processes and their reliance on contrasting sources of legitimisation (customary versus 
state) bred conflicts that undermined the scope for coordinating land use decisions. In the 
end these dual authority structures competing for power, precipitate the development of 
‘open access’ regimes. In effect communal areas residents are encouraged to violate 
resource use by-laws with impunity.
Cousins (1997) argues that all these factors depict that presently the rights, duties, 
responsibilities and powers of actors and institutions at “different levels within the matrix of 
communal land administration are ambiguous, conflictual, and highly contested.” In essence 
the institutional dynamics between traditional authorities and modem institutions of 
governance have engendered a paralysed situation in which there exists no effective tenure 
holding institutions to effectively control and manage resource use in the communal lands.
Mwenya (1992) observes that in Zambia, the absence of legitimate authority with a mandate 
over natural resources coupled with the sidelining of traditional leaders, resulted in 
communal areas residents failing to realise how resources over which they have no control 
are supposed to be utilised sustainably by them, Th e  passing of the new Land Act of 1995, 
which vests all land in the person of the President is understood by communal people to 
imply the demise of their power and control over the land they held resulting in the 
dissipation of their collective responsibility towards the natural resources. Th e  common 
perception among rural communities was" that the president owrts and had taken control over 
all their land ( IU C N -R O S A 3 9 9 € ).' L^wry (1989) argues that the imposition of state ownership 
resulted in the loss of legal ri^hts by traditional authorities to control local resource use. 
Bromley and Cernea (1989) also contend that it is the dissolution of common property
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resource management institutions at the local level through the imposition of state 
ownership, rather than any inherent unsuitability of the communal system of tenure, which is 
to blame for the degradation of most common property resources.
Impact of Differentiation on Governance in CBNRM
Although the authors could not find literature from South Africa indicating some form of 
socio-economic differentiation handicapping traditional institutions’ exercise of their authority 
in CBNRM, the cases of Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe are quite insightful. In Namibia’s 
communal lands, the “privatisation” of common property resources is also largely attributed 
to socio-economic differentiation and growing stratification (Jones, 1998). As Bromley and 
Cernea (1989) observe, with differentiation the similarity and convergence in community 
members’ interests gradually gave way to increased divergence of interests and unequal 
concentration of power. According to Bromley and Cernea (1989), this enabled more 
powerful families to press for exclusionary use and de facto appropriation of the commons, 
gradually subverting and eroding the corporate communal institutional arrangements. 
Generally, there is a disturbing lack of harmony of interests at the local level, and modem 
institutions of governance that are unfortunately being relied upon for natural resource 
management are dominated by the local elite, whose interests triumph in decisions 
pertaining to natural resource management.
In Namibia’s communal lands, headmen’s wards nominally contain groups of people who 
accept the authority of the same headmen and share a sense of community in other 
respects. In practice however, there are people living within the wards who look to other 
wards for their sense of ‘community’ and most wards contained people of different ethnic 
backgrounds. In effect, the exercise of consensus based traditional rule systems for 
resource use was significantly impaired.
Traditional authorities are effective in resource management in fairly undifferentiated and 
homogenous communities. It is worth noting that Zambia’s communal lands administration 
are also a stark contrast to this, as most of the communities are not homogeneous but 
differentiated along ethnic and economic lines engendering an environment where no notion 
of tribal, community or other cohesion existed (Chileshe, 1998). This rendered it 
impracticable to enforce resource use regulations whose sole effectiveness lies in 
consensual and harmonious relations. Under the new Land Act, foreign nationals have been 
allowed to acquire vast tracts of land displacing indigenous populations who had to be 
accommodated on land occupied by different tribes. This resulted in the lumping together of 
people from different ethnic groups with diverse customs and norms thereby curtailing the 
exercise of traditional resource regulations since their effectiveness hinges on shared value 
systems and collective cohesiveness. In essence, the modernising drive of communal lands 
resource management institutions has failed to take cognisance of the internal and cohesive 
logic of tradition and custom which had hitherto rendered traditional resource self sustaining 
and enduring.
In Zimbabwe’s communal lands a process of differentiation has also been noted among the 
peasantry (Scoones and Wilson 1989, Cousins 1990 ). Th e  advent of independence came 
with the introduction of increased access to markets, credit facilities and cash remittances for 
some households giving rise to a redefinition of individuals’ relationships with common 
properties and their relationship with each other (Scoones & Wilson 1989, Cousins 1990, 
Murombedzi 1990). High incidences of rich and powerful peasants expropriating and 
privatising the commons have been noted (Cheater 1989, Murombedzi 1990). Such 
differentiation resulting from the diversification of income earning opportunities and 
strategies within households impinged on traditional authorities’ ability to exercise authority 
in local resource management. In fact, the demise of local mechanisms for managing 
resources is for the most part attributed to the diversification of household economic 
strategies and economic differentiation making the emergence of community rules to meet 
contemporary resource management problematic (Lawry, 1989: 39).
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It is therefore not surprising to note that in Zimbabwe’s communal lands, the rich peasantry 
also dominates local politics. Those who align themselves with V ID C O  and W A D C O  officials 
could abuse natural resources without risking the wrath of the law. In a study of stone mining 
in Bepura communal lands in Guruve District, Mamimine (1999) observes that V ID C O s and 
W AD COs merely ‘presided’ over the degradation of the environment since they condoned 
over-mining of carving stones by the local elite and some outsiders.
Traditional Institutions in CBNRM
Traditional institutions of governance in their various guises continue to exercise some 
control over common property resources in much of Sub Saharan Africa’s communal land 
(Campbell et al, 1993, Nhira & Fortmann, 1993), as the following analysis of experience from 
Zimbabwe and South Africa will show.
Local controls remain the building blocks for common property resource institutions in many 
parts of Zimbabwe (Campbell et al, 1997). In a study of traditional institutions and local 
controls relating to trees and spaces of the local environment in Nyamaropa communal 
lands, Nyanga District, Mandondo (1997) observes that ‘controls’, could be broadly 
considered as an inclusive framework incorporating codified rules, taboos and regulatory 
norms. The aforementioned rules, taboos and norms have implications on the organization 
of (the local environment and regimes of resource utilization occurring in them (Mandondo 
1997).
Burial places, for example, were accorded special reverence because of their status as 
spaces where the dead who became spirits of the clan resided. They were held to be sacred 
and extraction of resources from such areas constituted gross desecration of their sacral 
significance and could attract secular, political and religious censure (Mandondo, 1997). 
Although there was scope for evading political censure by fellow human beings, Africans 
generally believed that ancestral spirits could not be evaded maintaining a universal 
omnipotent and omnipresent surveillance over the affairs of the living.
Ancestral spirits were believed to unleash divine visitations (misfortunes) upon those who in 
their extraction and utilization of resources violated the rules of the land. Spirits were also 
believed to inhabit certain flora and fauna as their hosts. Afzelia quanzensis (mugoriwondo), 
for instance, was believed to play host to rain spirits while Ficus capensis (muonde) and 
Cusonia spicatus (mushenje), were favoured by hunter spirits.
Water bodies and similar norms and taboos also protected the aquatic life resources in 
them. Some pools were believed to host lion clan spirits (mhondoro) and people fishing from 
them were limited to catching not more than two fish. Violating of these resource exploitation 
regulatory norms did not only attract the sanctions of the spirits but were also punishable by 
the chiefs, headmen or others of their lesser officials as they perceived any violation as likely 
to attract the wrath of the spirits against the community in its corporateness. In effect, 
political office in the form of traditional leadership such as chiefs, headmen and kraal-heads 
were instrumental in reinforcing what may appear to be purely religious beliefs and in so 
doing safeguard certain species from unsustainable exploitation and some spaces of the 
environment against wanton destruction.
Although traditional institutions for the management of common property resources in South 
Africa’s communal lands have been besieged by the onslaught of various external forces, 
they have however, demonstrated a high degree of resilience. Writing on the experiences of 
the Tswana of South Africa’s Northwest province, Ntsala (1995) observes that they have 
evolved through the ages, a highly- sophisticated conservation ethic that is expressed in 
taboos, totem animals, laws and customs passed down from generation to generation. 
Among the Tswana one important forum for the dissemination of this conservation ethic to 
successive generations is the “Bogwera” or traditional initiation school. As young men and 
women underwent initiation into adulthood, elders of the tribe stress the importance of 
resource conservation as the hallmark of tribal survival.
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Again, among the Tswana, Ntsala (1995) notes that most tree species could not be clean 
felled except when a tree was judged to be dying or if its trunk was needed for special 
medicinal use. Firewood could only be collected from deadwood lying on the ground while 
timber for building was obtained by cutting branches off living trees. Branches could not be 
cut from rare and protected trees without the prior consent of the chief who usually restricted 
such cutting to winter months and during early and late afternoons (Ntsala 1995). In effect 
this allowed for the regeneration of the branches.
Wildlife was similarly protected by a battery of taboos and customs which ensured its 
sustainable utilization. People were socialized to shun the killing of ecologically rare species. 
The vulture, for example, a highly endangered species was accorded exceptionally high 
protection status (Ntsala 1995). Th e  killing and consumption of the vulture, together with 
other rare and ecologically important species such as ox-peckers, egrets, secretary birds 
and pythons was prohibited. It is important to note that the majority of South Africans living in 
the communal areas did not eat these species. Permission for the killing of rare species was 
only granted to medicine men when the animals’ parts were required for a healer’s particular 
line of specialized medicine.
As noted earlier on, some of Namibia’s communal land chiefs are the custodians of the land. 
The chief has immediately below him the “ngambela” whose role is comparable to that of a 
Prime Minister. Th e  "ngambela" has senior “manduna” under him, and below him are minor 
“manafi/nas”(Katjiua1998). In the communal areas where they still wield some influence, 
traditional authorities hear cases, investigate and pronounce judgments on natural resource 
violations. In the East Caprivi, for example, where traditional authorities are well developed, 
communities have a strong sense of natural resource ownership. Katjiua (1998) observes 
that in East Caprivi communal areas, access to resources is not open as is usually assumed 
for communal lands. Instead, access is through membership of a tribe residing in the area, in 
East Caprivi, the history of natural resource management by traditional authorities’ stretches 
back to the colonial era of South African occupation. Although they were constantly sidelined 
and systematically weakened, they held their fort in trying to safeguard their natural 
resources. During the years of South African colonial administration a decline in wildlife 
populations began. East Caprivi residents apportioned the blame for this decline on 
translocation and indiscriminate killing by South African occupation forces. Realizing the 
continued decline of wildlife populations, traditional leaders consulted with their communities 
and approached the colonial Department of Nature Conservation to proclaim one Salambala 
Forest a conservation area. Their request was turned down due to lack of funds. However, 
they did not lose sight of their goal and after independence when the government started to 
formulate the conservancy policy, the traditional authorities resumed their request, and with 
the assistance of IR D NC formed a tentative Salambala Management Committee in 1995. 
With time, all the 19 areas under chief Listwani of the Masubiya people met to elect 
members of the Salambala Management Committee tasked with getting the conservancy off 
the ground. Th e  Salambala Conservancy consisting of forest and flood plains was to have 
7,000 -8 ,000 ha fenced on three sides to keep out livestock as well as allowing wildlife 
movement between the core area and the Chobe National Park in Botswana (Katjiua, 1998). 
The Management Committee and the constituent communities agreed that nobody should 
graze their livestock or reside in the core conservation area (Turner, 1996).
The conservancy is made up of 26 villages comprising 19 districts with each district having a 
number of village communities, which elect a representative to the Management Committee. 
The second representative on the committee is appointed by the ‘manduna’. Together, the 
two representatives are accountable to and report to their constituent communities and to 
the ‘manduna’ on the developments concerning the conservancy hence ensuring that 
traditional leadership and the whole community is kept informed (Katjuia, 1998). The 
involvement of traditional authorities in the management of conservancies has helped woo 
the support of communal area residents who had earlier on been alienated from their wildlife 
resource by the exclusionist policies of apartheid South Africa. Their role in conservancy
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management committees provide rural communities with a forum consistent with their culture 
for the deliberation and settlement of poaching and other resource use violations.
Traditional and Modem institutions of Governance in CBNRM
Although the paper has noted a prevailing chaotic institutional arrangement as resulting from 
the struggles for control of the communal lands between traditional and modern institutions 
of governance; governments and N G O s have to some extent realised the importance of 
involving traditional authorities in natural resource management. While traditional authorities 
have been begrudgingly incorporated into the local institutional matrix for natural resource 
management, some of them have acquitted themselves well as the following analysis of 
Namibia’s conservancy approach and Zambia’s A D M A D E  programme will highlight.
The Zambian government has also realized how communities’ lack of control over the 
resources in their areas essentially translates into a characteristic dearth of commitment to 
conserve and sustainably utilize them. In line with this, with the assistance of the Worldwide 
Fund [USA] and USAID, the government effected institutional changes necessary for the 
refinement of community based wildlife management. Th e  Department of National Parks and 
Wildlife Services instituted the Administrative Management Design [AD M AD E] and 
introduced ten G am e Management Areas (Mwenya 1992). A D M A D E  is basically an 
uncomplicated design for administering wildlife management through participation and 
leadership of communities resident in the Gam e Management Areas. Th e  design accords 
villagers an opportunity to participate in the use of their wildlife within the confines of their 
traditional respect for natural resources, their tribal customs and their sense of custodianship 
of wildlife (ibid). A D M A D E  established for each self-supporting wildlife management unit a 
local policymaking body made up of local chiefs and elected political representatives of 
government called ward chairmen. Senior government leaders, including the area’s member 
of parliament, district governor, provincial wildlife warden and the unit leader who is a 
National Parks and Wildlife Services officer trained to administer the A D M A D E  program 
constitute a body-the Wildlife Management Authority. W hen Wildlife Management 
Authorities convene tribal customary values of the traditional leaders coalesce with the 
technical views and opinions of resource specialists. Wildlife Management Sub-authorities 
were also established in each chiefdom, a unit with the local chief acting as the sub-authority 
chairman. Mwenya (1992) observes that sub- authorities gave local communities a forum 
consistent with their traditional customs to participate in formulating ideas on managing and 
developing their wildlife resources. Th e  channeling of revenue benefits from wildlife towards 
community development enhanced personal commitment in wildlife management efforts 
among chiefs serving as sub-authorities chairpersons. They in turn encouraged and fostered 
a spirit of cooperation among their communities with National Parks and Wildlife Services.
Discussion
Traditional authorities and modern institutions of governance can not do without each other. 
In order to ensure change and continuity, modern institutions of governance should not be 
allowed to completely displace traditional institutions of governance. Th e  two institutions 
should operate as 'nested enterprises’ (see Ostrom, 1990’s design principles). Th e  working 
together of the two institutions will compensate for the weakness identified by Chileshe 
(1998), that traditional leaders operate well in undifferentiated and homogenous 
communities. In fact, the 'discard approach’ adopted by some governments, in which 
traditional institutions of governance fall victim largely leaves C B N R M  as a major casualty. 
The situation on the ground calls for the respect of each other’s values and ideologies rather 
than the constant bickering that militates against community based natural resource 
management. Instead of perceiving traditional institutions as archaic arid retrogressive, with 
no significant role to play in today’s common property resource management, traditional 
authorities should be accommodated in any attempt towards the formulation or evolution of 
effective resource use regulatory mechanisms in communal lands. Governments and policy
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makers should be cognizant of the fact that traditional authorities are not only repositories of 
indigenous knowledge systems in natural resource management but also have hands on 
experience acquired over the years through intimate contact with the resources in question. 
Thus any emerging institutions for the management of common property resources on the 
rural landscape that fail to incorporate or treat traditional institutions as inconsequential are 
bound to worsen rather than ameliorate resource management. In the four Sub-Saharan 
African countries, traditional institutions continue to have a following, as they constitute a 
way of life for communal area residents. Th e  fact that some sections of these same 
communities in cahoots with the modern institutions portray traditional authorities in 
unfavourable light has only served to polarise communities hence rendering community 
based natural resource management difficult.
Nemarundwe (2000)’s observation that in the communal areas of Zimbabwe, villagers 
aligned themselves with either the traditional leadership or the modern institutions, namely 
the V ID C O s and W A D C O s  in order to be allocated land, depicts a chaotic institutional 
arrangement where no single authority seems to have legitimate and unchallenged land 
allocation powers. In this environment natural resource management regulations can not be 
comprehensively enforced as the two opposing camps, namely the traditional and the 
modern institutions allow flouting of rules to go uncensored as a means of attracting or 
retaining a following.
As noted in the review, Africans residing in the communal lands in the four Sub-Saharan 
countries, have resource management mechanisms subsumed into their cultures. Traditional 
institutions for the management of natural resources focus on utilizing and managing 
resources based on the knowledge of the community. This is done within the framework of 
their worldview, in other words, in accordance with their ethics, norms and beliefs 
[Juma1996], Hence post independence governments should at least take this as their point 
of departure if they are to be successful in instituting enduring community based natural 
resource management systems.
It is important to point out that where communal land is perceived as belonging to the 
president and not to those who use it as has been the case in Zambia following the passing 
of the new land Act, residents would not hesitate to exploit it as a 'degraded’ resource. 
W hen rural communities do not identify the land in their midst as belonging to them, they 
lack not only any vested interest in it but also the power to exclude and deny outsiders its 
use. There is thus urgent need for tenure reform to give peasants proprietary rights to the 
land they hold and consequent to these rights obligatory responsibilities towards the land 
and other resources will ensue.
Conclusion
A  review of literature indicates that in spite of the perception of traditional institutions as 
archaic and undemocratic held in some quarters, a successful and sustainable C B N R M  in 
Southern Africa would be attainable when this institution is regarded more as a partner than 
a competitor in community based natural resource management. Th e  goings on in Zambia 
and Namibia bear testimony to this. There is a need to recognise that both traditional and 
modern institutions of governance have a role to play in making C B N R M  a success. Case 
studies from Zimbabwe illustrate that where modem institutions of governance completely 
replace traditional institutions’ authority over CBN R M , they sometimes operate as stumbling 
blocks and worse still, also facilitate the degradation of natural resources.
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